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GENOCIDE: AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION?
John M. Raymond*
INTRODUCTION

Over twenty years ago, the United States signed the Genocide
Convention.' Since that time, two Presidents, Truman and Nixon,
have urged the Senate to advise and consent to its ratification, but
the Senate has not yet done so. The reasons for the Senate's failure
to ratify the convention provide the thesis of this article. At the
outset, I will discuss the basic arguments in favor of ratification.
This will be followed by a careful examination of the primary objections to ratification.
The approach followed is a bit unusual. Genocide is usually
thought of as a human rights matter. There is certainly a close
relationship between the arguments for and against ratification of
the Genocide Convention as well as the arguments concerning the
ratification of other human rights conventions. Accordingly, both
concepts will be discussed simultaneously. I will first endeavor to
review briefly the significant historical developments which have
brought the Genocide Convention and the other human rights conventions to their present posture. This will be followed by consideration of the basic objectives sought to be achieved by human rights
conventions generally and their ineffectiveness in bringing about the
desired result. Attention will then be given to the basic legal difficulty facing the United States in employing a treaty to deal with
such problems-a constitutional issue of fundamental importance.
Finally, I intend to direct attention specifically to the Genocide
Convention in order to examine to what extent it may differ from the
rest of the human rights conventions, and whether such differences
as do exist significantly affect the practical and legal difficulties previously discussed.
The Historical Perspective
All the world stood aghast at the monstrous and tragic artrocities committed in the fourth and fifth decades of this century by the
* A.B. Princeton University, 1916; J.D., Harvard University, 1921; Professorial
Lecturer Emeritus, University of Santa Clara School of Law; Visiting Professor, Hastings College of the Law, University of California.
1 See Appendix.
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Nazis in their attempt to exterminate certain non-Aryan groups,
notably the Jews. Adolph Eichmann, who was in charge of this
program, estimated 6,000,000 Jews were killed, 4,000,000 of them
in extermination institutions.' Genocide had been impressively
demonstrated for all people to ponder.
The first action taken to prevent any recurrence of such a
tragedy was the agreement of August 8, 1945, between the United
States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union, which
established the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal. This Charter
set forth certain crimes which the Tribunal was to try, including
"Ccrimes against humanity: . . . persecutions on political, racial or
religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,"' that is, in execution of, or
in connection with, launching or carrying on a war of aggression or
committing war crimes. The Tribunal proceeded to try the hierarchy
of Nazi officialdom who were responsible for the program of eliminating the Jews. However, it considered only those acts committed in
connection with the war, and not the notorious persecutions that had
taken place within Germany before 1939."
Clearly, it was time that genocide be condemned in general
terms, not limiting it to wartime conditions. It was not only appropriate but highly desirable for the United States to join in a resolution
5
of the General Assembly of the United Nations which affirmed that
genocide was a crime under international law, whether committed
in war or in peace. The resolution defined genocide as: "a denial of
the right of existence of entire human groups, as homicide is the
denial of the right to live of individual human beings"; and it recited that "[m]any instances of such crimes of genocide have occurred when racial, religious, political and other groups have been
destroyed, entirely or in part."'
Soon thereafter, the United Nations prompted the preparation
of an international convention which: (1) defined genocide as the
commission of certain acts "with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group" ("political" was
omitted because of Soviet objection);' (2) declared genocide to be
2 Nuremberg Judgment 1 TRIAL Or T E MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 171, 252-53 (Nuremberg 1947) [hereinafter cited

as Judgment].
3 59 Stat. 1544, 1547, at art. 6(c).
4 Judgment at 252-53.
5 GA. Res. 96 (Dec. 11, 1946). See also 11 WHITMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW 848 (1968).
6 Id.
7 Hearings on Exec. 0, 81st Cong. 1st Sess. before a Subcomm. of
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1971).
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a crime under international law; (3) committed parties to the convention to make genocide punishable under their own law; and,
(4) provided for extradition of those committing genocide to the
site of their crime.' President Truman submitted this convention to
the Senate in 1949 for its consent to ratification.' The Foreign
Relations Committee, to which it was referred, held hearings, but
nothing further happened. 10 Finally, after being prodded by President Nixon," the Committee gave the Convention a favorable report
in 1971.12 The full Senate has taken no action with respect to the
Report.
In a broader aspect, those who gathered at San Francisco in
1945 to draft the Charter of the United Nations determined that it
should be one of the purposes of that organization "[t]o achieve
international cooperation ... in promoting and encouraging respect
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion."' 8 Pursuant thereto,
the General Assembly, approximately twenty years ago, set forth certain agreed principles concerning human rights in a document known
as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.' 4 The United States
quite rightly joined in approving the Declaration. The General Assembly then proceeded to put these principles into treaty form, and
a number of international conventions were drafted, 6 including the
one concerning genocide. Generally speaking, these conventions set
forth certain human rights to which all persons, or all in a specified
group, were said to be entitled; and, they were drafted in such a
way as to make parties to them legally bound to accept and follow
such principles.
Two of these conventions, together with a third in the field of
human rights prepared by the International Labor Organization,
were submitted to the Senate by President Kennedy in 1963.16 The
8 Id. at 7.
9 Id. at 2.
10 S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, Legislative Calendar 6 (April 11, 1968).
11 S. EXEc. Doc. No. B, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. Preface (1970).
12 S. EXEC. REP. No. 92-6, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
a 59 Stat. 1037, at art. 1.
14 G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). See also 5 WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 237-42 (1968) [hereinafter cited as WHITEMAN].
15 See, for example, the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery,
the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, and The Convention on the Political Rights of Women. The texts appear in 1 INT'L LAWYER 590,
597 (1966-67). See also 1 INT'L LAWYER at 620-23 for other human rights conventions
in process or approved. Of these, the texts of the two principal human rights conventions, that on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and Civil and Political Rights,
may be found in 61 Am. J. INT'L L. 861, 870 (1967).
10 Hearings on Execs. J, K, and L, before a Subcomm. oj the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). See also 1 INT'L LAWYER 590 (196667).
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convention prepared by the International Labor Organization con-

cerned the Abolition of Forced Labor. Each state that became a
party undertook "to suppress and not to make use of any form of
forced or compulsory labor" for certain specified purposes, and "to

take effective measures to secure the immediate and complete abo-

17
lition of forced or compulsory labor" for those purposes. The second convention, the U.N. Convention on the Political Rights of
Women, reads like a statute: "Women shall be entitled to vote in
all elections on equal terms with men .... Women shall be eligible
for election to all publicly elected bodies ... on equal terms with
men .... Women shall be entitled to hold public office and to exer8 In
,,.
cise all public functions . . . on equal terms with men .
19
conventions.
two
these
1967, the Senate declined to ratify

The third of the conventions submitted by President Kennedy,
the Supplementary Convention to Suppress Slavery and the Slave
Trade, was designed to intensify efforts to eliminate the international trade of slaves, the practice of slavery, and similar institutions.
It supplemented a 1926 convention on the same subject to which the
United States had been a part since 1929. In 1967, the Senate gave
its advice and consent to the ratification of this convention, and the
President promptly ratified it.2 °
Despite the sluggish response of the Senate, the arguments in
favor of U.S. ratification of genocide and the other human rights
conventions do have a strong emotional appeal. In 1950, Dean Rusk,
then Deputy Undersecretary of State, testifying in favor of ratification of the Genocide Convention, stated:
...The history of our own civilization begins with the deliberate mass
extermination of Christians by the imperial government of Rome. But
the worst atrocities of Nero against the Christians failed to reach the
level of those perpetrated by Hitler against the Jews .... These events

so shocked the conscience of civilized men that, after World War II,
it had come to be accepted that such conduct could no longer be tolerated in civilized society and that it should be prohibited by the international community. .... 21
I can only express, on behalf of the State Department, our earnest
hope that the Senate of the United States, by giving its advice and
consent to the ratification of this convention, will demonstrate to the
rest of the world that the United States is determined to maintain its
develmoral leadership in international affairs and to participate in the
22
opment of international law on the basis of human justice.
17 1 INTI'LAwYER 590, 595 (1966-67).
18 Id. at 597.
19 S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, Legislative Calendar 7 (April 11, 1968).
20 18 U.S.T. 3201, T.I.A.S. 6418 (1967).
21 22 DEPT. STATE BULL. 163 (1950); 11 WHITEmAN, supra note 14, at 858-59.
22 22 DEPT. STATE BULL. at 165 (1950) ; 11 WMTEMAN, supra note 14, at 862.
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After President Kennedy had submitted the three above-mentioned human rights conventions to the Senate, Harlan Cleveland,
then Assistant Secretary of State, put forward the case for ratification of such conventions:
Dozens and even scores of countries have already ratified some of these

human rights conventions. Even though the rights covered in these international conventions are fully secured by our Federal and State
laws, we should feel uncomfortable standing aside from the internationalization of social doctrine which we ourselves hold among our
most cherished national assets. There is, after all, something otherworldly about the spectacle of a United States Government too squeamish or too indifferent to take a stand against human slavery or forced
23
labor.

In the face of appeals such as these, one senses that he must be
a renegade or a racist when he lifts his voice in opposition to ratification of the genocide and human rights conventions. Yet, there are,
in fact, a great many members of the American bar who see problems
that merit serious consideration before any such step is taken. Indeed, some believe that there are compelling reasons for not joining
in such conventions.
Twice the American Bar Association has voted to recommend
against ratification of the Genocide Convention, although by a
much smaller margin in 1970 than in 1949.24 In 1967, it opposed
United States ratification of two of the three human rights conventions then under consideration by the SenateY. The third, which the

Bar favored, was the Supplementary Convention to Suppress Slavery
and the Slave Trade, which, as noted above, the United States has
since ratified. This consistent opposition voiced by a responsible organization is not opposition to the punishment of genocide nor opposition to the protection and promotion of human rights. On the contrary, the resolutions of the American Bar Association against ratification,2 6 have explicitly declared support for the principles expressed
in the resolution of the General Assembly on Genocide and in the
Universal Declaration of Human.Rights.
Why, then, opposition to the conventions? The opposition does
not strike at the objectives or premises underlying the conventions
but rather at the method used to achieve them. The opposition has
two aspects: the impracticability of the method to achieve the desired ends, and the illegality of the use of the treaty-power in a way
which would render an unconstitutional result in this country.
23

58 Amr.

24

74 A.B.A. REP. 146-50 (1949); 95 A.B.A. RzP. 134-37 (1970).
92 A.BA. REP. 342-43 (1967).
See note 24, supra.

25
26

J. INT'L

L. 996, 997 (1964).
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Ineffectiveness of the Method
What do the advocates of ratification see as the objective of
human rights conventions? It appears that the aim of these conventions is to get other nations which have undesirable practices in the
field of human rights to undertake by treaty to change their ways.
No one has advanced the argument or attempted to claim that human
rights in this country would be improved by our ratifying any of
these treaties, for the United States has already done substantially
everything provided for by the conventions. Why, then, should the
United States ratify them?
The argument for ratification is that put forth by our former
Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg: "[I] f we do
not consider it important to sign the conventions, why should [other
nations]? Or, more important, why should they implement the conventions?" 27 This would seem, also, to be the thought underlying the
arguments of Dean Rusk and Harlan Cleveland that the United
States should "maintain its moral leadership"" for "we should feel
uncomfortable standing aside."2 9 The argument is a bit more fully
developed in the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, which reads as follows:
Although such conventions generally specify standards already observed in the United States, it has an interest in seeing that they are

observed by as many states as possible, not merely to protect its own
standards but to promote conditions abroad that will foster economic
development and democratic institutions that are conducive to prosperity in the United States and achievement of its foreign policy objec-

tives. It cannot effectively urge other states to adhere to such conventions without doing so itself.8 0

But neither the Restatement, Goldberg, Rusk, nor Cleveland
explain how ratification by the United States will achieve any reforms in other countries where human rights are being infringed.
The view of these advocates of ratification tacitly assumes that, if
we ratify, the countries which have objectionable practices will then
become parties to the conventions, and thereupon institute internal
reform. But consider the situation. Let us say Country A does not
let women vote, or that it persecutes a minority group of another
tribe living within its borders, and that the practice is traditional
and is not questioned by the vast majority of the people. If the
27 Gardner, A Costly Anachronism, 53 A.B.A.J. 907, 908 (1967).
28 11 Wrn=EmAN, supra note 14, at 862.
29 58 Am. J. INT'L L. 997 (1964).
30 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TH'E FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 118, at 375 (1965)

(Reporter's note).
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United States now joins in these conventions, and urges Country A
to do the same, what may we anticipate? The most probable result
would be that Country A would say that it does not care to change
its ways, and, in any event, it could not do so without a long period
of time to reeducate its population. Therefore, Country A would
not want to join in the conventions and assume obligations that it
might not be able to keep.
But suppose that, by diplomatic pressures, we convince Country
A to agree to sign and ratify. Will Country A implement the terms
of the conventions by enacting the required legislation or by taking
the appropriate executive action to make the reforms? Or, will it
ignore its treaty obligations? Might it interpret them in a way to
excuse continuing its practices? Certainly, if it is not ready and willing to reform its institutions it will not do so. But, on the other
hand, if it should be ready and willing to reform, joining in a convention which imposes the obligation to do so will not be the cause
but rather the result of the change of heart. One of the foremost advocates of U.S. ratification, Professor Richard N. Gardner, has
said: "The positive consequences of United States adherence are
hard to measure."'" In point of fact, they are completely illusory.
Many believe the proper technique to achieve the desired result is through education and persuasion." To repeat, the United
States may educate and attempt to persuade Country A to change
its ways, but unless it is actually persuaded, it will not ratify the
conventions; or, if it does ratify, it certainly will not implement
them. If, on the other hand, Country A should be persuaded to
change its ways, its joinder in the conventions is merely gilding the
lily of its conversion to the faith.
The fundamental reason that the convention method of attempting to secure human rights will be futile is that the problem
of the denial of such rights arises from the way a government treats
its own subjetcs or permits them to be treated by others within its
own territory. Therefore, the only way the situation can be changed
is by that government itself taking action to change its own internal
legislation, and/or its own executive practices. It will not be accomplished by international agreements, no matter how well-intentioned. Only Country A can stop the persecutions within its borders,
just as only Country A can give the vote to its women.
31 Gardner, note 27 supra.
32 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles testified on April 6, 1953, that it was

the intention "to encourage the promotion everywhere of human rights and individual
freedoms, but to favor methods of persuasion, education, and example rather than
formal undertakings which commit one part of the world to impose its particular
social and moral standards upon another part of the world community, which has
different standards." 12 WIEMAN, supra note 14, at 668.
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Some may argue that an international convention is a contract
legally binding between the states that are parties, and, therefore, it
can be enforceable against any delinquent state. True, there are legal
obligations created when a state joins in a convention, but enforcement is another matter. Only with a state's consent can it be hauled
into court, national or international. 3 But, assuming this obstacle is
overcome, there remains another-a political-difficulty that is
practically insurmountable. How do you get another state that is a
party to the convention to take the necessary steps to bring suit?
Or, as a more likely alternative, how do you get another state to
exert diplomatic pressure to secure compliance?
Whatever their protestations of concern may be with regard
to respect for human rights, governments are very sensitive about
interference by other governments in matters involving the way they
deal with their own subjects. Moreover, they are very reluctant to
bring pressure to bear on another government when such matters
are involved, either for fear of retaliation or out of appreciation for
another government's domestic sensitivities. Ambassador Richardson
of Jamaica put the problem very simply:
What does the average citizen want of international law in this area

[of human rights]? He wants to procure what the legislation of his
own state has not done. He wants effective protection and effective
remedies. [But], remedies . . . are unavailable unless the victim can
get a state other than his own to make a complaint against his government. To do this would usually be highly prejudicial to the intersituation is therefore highly prejudicial
ests of the other state, and the
34
to the victim's own interests.
Professor John Carey, who served on the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights, notes that, even when sanctions are invoked, if the

delinquent government does not wish to change its ways, it will not
do so. He points out that economic sanctions were invoked by the
United Nations against Rhodesia, but Rhodesia did not change its
white supremacy policies. Further, various U.N. resolutions of condemnation and demands for change were used to persuade South
Africa to abandon its apartheid policy, but without success. Carey
comments: "Coercion is unreliable not just because it usually fails
to compel but also because states fail to use it fully. Too many influences affect third-party governments besides the plight of the victims." 5 Again, to quote Ambassador Richardson: "[I]t is impos" National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 358 (1955); Eastern
Carelia Case, [1923] P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 5, at 27.
34
Richardson, Will the Rapidly Accumulating Body of U.N. Law on Racial
Discrimination Truly be Effective?, 1970 Paoc.Eou'is, Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. 110, 111.
1 35 J. CAREY, U.N. PROTUCTION OF CIVI AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 34 (1970).
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sible to attain effective outside coercion. Only
a nation's own people
'86
are able to establish the necessary remedies.
On the same point, to attempt to control by international agreement internal matters that only the individual state can control is
not only futile, it is extremely unwise. If a hypothetical treaty dealt
with a matter in which the United States were forced to change existing practices-for example, a treaty requiring states to enfranchise
all citizens 16 years of age-we would look on such an attempt by
other states to control our voting age as being intervention in our
internal affairs. In short, we would resent this sort of intermeddling
by other nations. Former Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles,
looking at the effect of a human rights treaty on the people of this
country, put it this way: "[T] he relations of our people as between
themselves and as between themselves and their [g]overnment are
not properly a concern of other people and do not 8have
any direct
7
bearing upon our conduct in the society of nations.1
It is futile, unwise, and hence quite wrong to employ a treaty
for the sole purpose of attempting to control the relations between
a government and its own people, or the relations of those people
among themselves. This is a specific aspect of a broad political reality.
It "is an uphill struggle to attempt to regulate through law conduct
that states simply are not yet ready or willing to have regulated ....
[A] ton of treaties will not solve a problem as to which an essentially
political consensus has not previously been reached .... .18
The Basic Legal Objection
Let us now turn to consideration of the legal questions involved
if the United States were to join in a treaty designed to solve human
rights problems that exist in other countries. And, in particular,
let us examine the legal problem which the United States may face
under its own Consitution.
Human rights conventions are legal documents drafted to
create legal rights and obligations for the states that become parties
to them. Some of these conventions would be self-executing, that is,
they would automatically become the law of the United States upon
their ratification by virtue of the provisions of Article VI, clause 2
of the Constitution which makes treaties "the law of the land."
Others would create legally-binding obligations between the parties
requiring them to implement the provisions of the conventions by
30 Richardson, note 34 supra, at 114.
87 Hearings on S.i. Res. 1 before the

Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 183 (1955).
88 Bilder, The Office of the Legal Adviser, 56 Am. J. INT'L L. 633, 680 (1962).
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9
enacting legislation which would then create domestic law." But,
they are all designed to establish, directly or indirectly, domestic law
for the states that become parties. Obviously, treaties are of a
different character from a simple declaration of principles, which
merely declares standards that all nations should strive to follow. To
state principles that should guide all mankind is one thing; but to
contemplate entering into international legal obligations, and making
law for the United States, raises new and serious questions.

One point is undoubtedly clear. Our ratification of a human
rights treaty would not make law for any other country. It would not
even create a treaty obligation for any other country to enact the
necessary reforms. Ratification by the United States would have no
effect whatsoever as a binding force of the treaty on the delinquent
state and would in no way assist the latter's solution of its problem.
Our act would be superfluous and of no value in accomplishing the
desired objectives of the human rights conventions.
What our ratification would, in fact, accomplish is quite different. It would either make law for the United States (if the treaty
were self-executing), or it would create an international obligation
on our part to enact legislation which would implement the treaty
provisions. Thus, directly or indirectly, ratification would make law
for this country. It would accomplish nothing else. This brings the
basic constitutional issue into focus. Is this a proper use of our
treaty-making power?
The Constitution of the United States contains two provisions
which establish the fundamental scheme of legislative power. Article
I, Section 1, states: "All legislative Powers herein granted [to the
Federal Government] shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives."
The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads:
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
89 The distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties was
pointed out by Chief Justice Marshall in Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.)
253, 313-14 (1829):
A treaty is, in its nature, a contract between two nations, not a legis[the] constitution declares a treaty
lative act .... In the United States ....
to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of
justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself, without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms of the
stipulation import a contract-when either of the parties engages to perform
a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial
department; and the legislature must execute the contract, before it can become a rule for the court.
In a number of countries no treaty has the effect of domestic law until implemented
by legislation. This is true, for example, of the British Commonwealth countries. See
Attorney General for Canada v. Attorney General for Ontario, [1937] 1 D.L.R. 687
(1937).
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nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." The scheme of authority to legislate in this
country is thus prescribed: Congress, and not the Senate alone, or in
conjunction with the President, can enact federal legislation; all
other legislation must be enacted by the States of the Union, or by
the people. To employ the treaty power, which is exercised by the
President with the advise and consent of the Senate and without
consulting the House of Representatives, solely to enact a law for
the country would appear to be clearly unconstitutional."
It is, of course, true that Article VI, clause 2, of the Constitution provides: "[A]l1 treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land .

. . ."

But this provision is merely stating the effect of self-

executing treaties that are properly ratified. Article II, Section 2,
clause 2, states that the President "shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided twothirds of the Senators present concur. . .

."

These two provisions are

not to be read as creating still a third way that may be employed,
whenever desired, to enact legislation. To adopt such a construction
would be to disregard the constitutionally-specified boundaries, the
traditional and accepted form of legislative action of our country,
and would seem certainly to be beyond the scope of the treaty
power.4 Rather, these provisions should be read as meaning that
when a matter is proper for handling by treaty, appropriate provisions of a treaty made by the President with the advice and consent
of the Senate will become the law of this country. The advocates of
ratification of human rights treaties have not argued otherwise, and
it is believed that there is no real difference of opinion on this point.
We are thus led to the question: When is a matter proper for
handling by treaty? This was discussed many years ago by a very
distinguished jurist and statesman, Charles Evans Hughes, who was
at that time a Judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice
and the President of the American Society of International Law, a
former Secretary of State, and soon to become the Chief Justice of
40 "1 do not believe that treaties should, or lawfully can, be used as a device to
circumvent the constitutional procedures established in relation to what are essentially
matters of domestic concern." Secretary of State Dulles, quoted with approval in
Power Authority of the State of New York v. Federal Power Comm'n, 247 F.2d 538,
543 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
41 A frequently quoted statement of the Supreme Court of the United States
seems to support this conclusion:
The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited except by those restraints . . . arising from the nature of the government itself
and of that of the States. It would not be contended that it extends so far
as to authorize . . . a change in the character of the government or in that
of one of the States . . ..
Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890).
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the United States Supreme Court.42 Advocates of ratification quote
and rely on his statement that the treaty power "is to deal with
foreign nations with regard to matters of international concern. 43
They point to the Charter of the United Nations which, in a number
of places, talks of respect for and promotion of human rights," and
they argue that human rights have therefore become a "matter of
international concern." They conclude that the conventions are
within the treaty power. 5
But this is to take Hughes' statement out of context. What he
had in mind is disclosed as one reads further in his statement. He
proceeded to say that,
if we attempted to use the treaty-making power to deal with matters
which did not pertain to our external relations but to control matters
which normally and appropriately were within the local jurisdiction of
the States, then I again say there might be ground for implying a limitation upon the treaty-making power that it is intended for the purpose of having treaties made relating to foreign affairs and not to make
laws for the people of the United States in their internal
concerns
46
through the exercise of the asserted treaty-making power.
42 23 PROC., Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. 194, 195 (1929), cited in Henkin, The Constitution, Treaties and International Human Rights, 116 U. PA. L. Rav. 1012, 1023 n.53

(1967-68).
43 See, for example, Gardner, 1 INT'IL LAWYER 633-34 (1966-67); Goldberg &
Gardner, Time to Act on the Genocide Convention, 58 A.B.A.J. 141 (1972); Henkin,
The Constitution, Treaties and InternationalHuman Rights, 116 U. PA. L. Rav. 1012,
1023 (1967-68) [hereinafter cited as Henkin].
Another frequently quoted expression used to support ratification is a statement
found in several cases in the Supreme Court. It appears to have had its origin in
Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 266 (1890), where the Court said: "That the treaty
power of the United States extends to all proper subjects of negotiation between our
government and the governments of other nations, is clear." The Court used this language to support the use of the treaty power to grant citizens of France certain rights
of inheritance in this country in return for reciprocal privileges granted our citizens
in France. As the Court proceeded to state, this was dearly a fitting subject for international negotiation and regulation by treaty provisions. Other cases which have
adopted this language were likewise dearly cases where the subject was proper for
such treatment. Nothing has turned on this language, for there has never been the
question of whether the subject was "proper."
Advocates of ratification have tried to read this language to mean that any
subject that the President or the Senate may deem appropriate is thereby qualified
as a proper subject to be dealt with by treaty-in short, that there is no objective
constitutional standard for what may be done by treaty. See Henkin at 1025, supra;
Busch et al, Statement, 1 INT'L LAWYER 638, 640 (1966-67); McChesney, Should the
United States Ratify the Covenants? A Question of Merits, Not of Constitutional
Law, 62 A.m. J. INT'L L. 912, 916 (1968). This view completely overlooks the word
"proper" in the quoted matter from Geofroy, and furthermore completely by-passes
the constitutional question which is the heart of our problem. Surely the Court in
Geofroy was not giving a reasoned opinion on this undecided and difficult point of
constitutional law. It most certainly was not stating the proposition promoted by
Henkin and others. See note 41, supra.
44 See U.N. CHARTER Preamable, 2nd cl.; art. 1, para. 3; art. 13, para. 1(b); art$.
55-59; art. 62. 59 Stat. 1033 et. seq.
41 See note 43, supra.
46 See note 42, supra,
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It has already been shown that human rights are matters that
concern the relations between a government and its subjects, or
between the people themselves, and that they can only be dealt with
by internal action of the country concerned. They "do not have any
direct bearing upon our conduct in the society of nations." 47 They
cannot, by any stretch of meaning, be included in the terms "external relations" or "foreign affairs." External relations and foreign
affairs deal with matters between states of the world, not those
between a government and its subjects.
To illustrate, a current example of a problem in the field of
foreign affairs is the international traffic of narcotics." We cannot
hope to control our own narcotics problems without the cooperation
of other nations. They must control the source of supply abroad and
stem the flow of such drugs into this country through international
transport. International agreement on a cooperative solution of this
problem is clearly within the ambit of foreign affairs.4"
Contrast this situation with the problems of granting the vote
to women in another country, or stemming persecutions which are
being carried out by a foreign country within its own borders. The
solution of such problems requires only the action of the state
involved. International cooperation is in no way required or useful.
United States ratification of conventions which seek to put an end
47 See note 37 and accompanying text, supra.

48 See the various narcotics conventions listed in TREATIES IN FORCE 328-31
(1971).
A similar situation is that dealt with by the Convention to Suppress Slavery and
the Slave Trade, and the Supplementary Convention on the same subject. These
treaties were designed to stop the international traffic in slaves as well as to suppress
the practice of slavery within States where it still existed. The Parties agreed to
prohibit the transport of slaves on their ships and aircraft as well as the embarkation
and disembarkation of slaves in their ports; and they agreed to abolish slavery and
forms of forced labor akin to slavery in territories under their respective jurisdictions.
These two conventions are at best close cases, and many believe that we should not
have joined in them; but they do have an international aspect in dealing with the
transport of slaves, which, as in the case of the narcotics problem, was an essential
element in the solution.
49 Another argument advanced by advocates of ratification is that the Supreme
Court has held that a treaty may be used to secure protection of migratory birds, so it
certainly can be employed to protect human beings. See Gardner, A Costly Anachronism, 53 A.B.A.J. 907, 910 (1967). But this overlooks the factual situation in the case
being decided (Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920)) and the rationale of the
Court. In that case, the Court pointed out that the treaty "recited that many species
of birds in their annual migrations traversed certain parts of the United States and
of Canada, that they were of great value as a source of food and in destroying insects
injurious to vegetation, but were in danger of extermination through lack of adequate
protection." Id. at 431. The treaty prescribed for each state cooperative measures of
conservation and protection. The Court said that here was "a national interest of very
nearly the first magnitude [which] can be protected only by national action in concert with that of another power." (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 435. Here was a
problem of concern to both states which neither could handle without the cooperation
of the other. It was clearly a matter of foreign affairs.
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to such practices would only have an effect within the United States;
°
it could not possibly advance the solution of these problems abroad."
In short, to employ the phraseology of Hughes, our ratification
would be a use of the treaty power "to deal with matters which did
not pertain to our external relations ... to foreign affairs . . ." and
it would only have one result: it would "make laws for the people
of the United States in their internal concerns"-matters which
normally and appropriately were within the local jurisdiction of the
United States. This is precisely what the distinguished Chief Justice
5
said was not a proper use of the treaty power. "
Opponents of ratification therefore contend that consideration of
the constitutional provisions discussed above and reflection upon the
views of a former Chief Justice of the United States raise most
serious constitutional doubts about the validity of using the treaty
power to deal with genocide and human rights. Inasmuch as these
doubts exist, such action should not be taken when nothing can be
contributed to the desired solution of the problem by U.S. ratification.
THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION

The foregoing discussion generally presents the basic constitutional objection to ratification of the human rights conventions.
However, it is, of course, true that each treaty should be examined
in detail to be sure that it in fact presents a case to which this
objection applies, as well as to see whether there are other legal
objections. The Genocide Convention, therefore, must be examined
with these purposes in mind.
The Scheme Of The Convention
There is one noticeable difference between the Genocide Convention and the other human rights conventions. The Genocide
Convention is aimed at deterrence by making genocide punishable,
while other human rights treaties are generally aimed at achieving
internal reforms by prescribing standards which would eliminate or
prevent objectionable practices. The Genocide Convention defines
genocide and declares that the following acts "shall be punishable":
the commission of genocide, conspiracy to commit it, direct and
2
public incitement to commit it, and complicity in genocide. But it
50 Secretary of State Dulles, an able international lawyer, said the treaty power
may not be exercised with respect to matters "which do not essentially affect the
actions of nations in relation to international affairs, but are purely internal." See
note 37, supra.

51 As quoted in Henkin, The Constitution, Treaties and International Human
Rights, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1012, 1023 (1967-68).
52 See Appendix at arts. II, III, IV. See also 11 WHI=EmAN, supra note 14, at
849-50.
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does not purport to be self-executing. Rather, it imposes an obligation on the parties "to enact . . . the necessary legislation to give
effect to the provisions of the present Convention and, in particular,
to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide."5
The other significant obligation of the Convention is found in
Articles VI and VII which state: "[t]he Contracting Parties pledge
themselves ... to grant extradition in accordance with their laws and
treaties" of persons who commit genocide abroad in order to return
them for trial in the country where their crime was committed.54
In point of fact, the obligation is to provide by treaty or law for such
extradition.
Thus, the scheme of the Convention is that each state that is a
party shall, by appropriate measures, make the specified acts punishable when committed within its jurisdiction, and extraditable when
committed within the jurisdiction of any other party.
The Impracticability Of The Method
It should be noted that the Genocide Convention would probably
be just as ineffective a method to prevent genocide as the Convention on the Political Rights of Women would be to secure the vote
for women. Genocide is committed because of a policy decision to
destroy, in whole or in part, a certain group of human beings. As for
genocide in peace time within a particular country, only the government of that country can prevent or stop it. The reason for this has
already been set forth above, especially in connection with the
example of Country A persecuting members of a hostile tribe who
are living within its borders.55 There is no need to repeat it here.
It is inconceivable that Nero would have withheld his persecution of
the Christians because of a treaty.
Insofar as genocide may occur in time of war, can anyone believe that Hitler would have been deterred from his policies regarding the extermination of the Jews by a convention declaring it a
crime? He was not deterred by numerous treaties which proscribed
the very things that he did, including those outlawing aggressive war
and those defining the conventional war crimes. The Nuremberg
Tribunal's opinion and those of other tribunals that tried and convicted war criminals of the Nazi regime have set forth the details
so that the world may know exactly what happened.56 Those who
53 See Appendix at art. V. See also Tate, Deputy Legal Adviser, Dept. of State, 22
DEPT. STATE BULL. 91-92 (1950), reprinted in 14 WHITEMAN, supra note 14, at 313-14.
54 See 11 WHITEMAN at 848 et seq, supra note 14.

55 See text accompanying note 31, supra.
56 See Judgment, supra note 2. See also the twelve cases reported in TRIAL OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL
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read them can see for themselves that treaties do not prevent such
crimes in time of war when a government or its leaders adopts a
policy in contravention of them. To take even more modern situations, would Nigeria have refrained from eliminating Biafra, or
would the needless slaughter of human beings in East Pakistan, now
Bangladesh, have been avoided had the Genocide Convention been
in force for the parties to the struggle? Treaties are not an appropriate means to control such highly-charged situations.
Let us revert again to the hypothetical case of Country A which
is persecuting a minority group within its borders. Even if a treaty
might have some deterrent effect, ratification by the United States
of the Genocide Convention would not make genocide punishable
in Country A. Only the enactment of appropriate legislation by
Country A and its own enforcement thereof would punish the offender. Nor will our ratification permit us to extradite to Country A
one who has committed genocide there. Only the making of a bilateral extradition treaty by Country A with the United States will
permit this. Our ratification of the Convention would, of course, give
other parties to the Convention the right to demand that we enter
into extradition treaties with them covering genocide. However, if
we are prepared to become a party to the Convention, we must be
prepared to make such extradition treaties. Our ratification would
give other states nothing that they would not have in any event.
Hence, our ratification would have no significant effect abroad.
Thus, we see that the Genocide Convention is unlikely to be
of any value in deterring genocide, and ratification of the Convention
by the United States will not make genocide punishable anywhere
else in the world. Hence, without further action by the particular
foreign government concerned, it will not even lay the foundation for
us to extradite to that country persons who may be wanted there for
committing genocide.
The Implementation Of The Convention In The United States
If, in spite of the foregoing considerations, we decide to join in
the Convention, the question arises as to whether we can implement
its provisions. Mr. Justice Holmes said in Missouri v. Holland: "If
the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the
[implementing] statute under Article I, § 8 [of the Federal Constitution] as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the
Government." 57
LAw No. 10 (1946-49). See also, for lesser offenders, U.N. WAR CRIMES COMMISSION,
LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS (1948-49).

57 252 U. S. at 432.
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But we must look further. The Report of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee states that its consent to ratification is conditioned upon the United States not depositing its instrument of ratification until after such legislation has been enacted. This raises the
question of whether Congress has the power to enact a statute where
it is not done to implement any existing treaty of the United States.
Article I, Section 8, clause 10, of the Constitution provides:
"The Congress shall have Power.. . [t]o define and punish Piracies
and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the
Law of Nations. . . ." If genocide, is indeed, an "offence against the
law of nations," that is, an offense under international law, the authority is clear.
The Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal declared: "The following acts . . . are crimes . . . for which there shall be individual
responsibility: ...CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: ...persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in
connection with" the launching or carrying on of a war of aggression
or the commission of war crimes. 59 This obviously did not make similar actions crimes under international law when committed in peace
time. Does it make such acts, committed in connection with war,
crimes under international law? Can four nations by agreement make
international law for the rest of the world? In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the International Court of Justice held that a
new principle of law set forth in a convention to which thirty-nine
states were parties was not legally binding on a state that was not
a party."0 It would seem clear that the Four-Power Nuremberg
Charter did not make international law for the world, although it
did declare law of limited application for those that were parties to it.
Did the Resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations which "affirms that genocide is a crime under international
law"'" make new internationallaw for the world? Decidedly not, for
the General Assembly is not a legislative body empowered to make
62
law.
58 S. ExEc. REP. No. 92-6, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1971) (emphasis added).
59 1 TRIAL OF MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBuNAL 10 (Nuremberg 1947); 59 Stat. 1544, 1547, at art. 6(c).
60 [1969] I.C.J. 3, 24-27.
61 G.A. Res. 96 (Dec. 11, 1946); 11 WHITEMAN, supra note 14, at 848.
62 "Of course we all know that the Assembly is not a legislature ...." Chayes,
The Legal Adviser, Dept. of State, 48 DEPT. STATE BULL. 835, 837 (1963). In drafting
the United Nations Charter, it "was clearly decided . . . that the General Assembly
should not be given the function of international legislation." Sloan, The Binding

Force of a "Recommendation" of the General Assembly of the United Nations, XXV
BaIT. Y.B. INTL L. 1, 6-7 (1948). See also other authorities collected in 13 WHITEMAN,

supra note 14, at 548-52.
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But that is not the complete answer. An expressed consensus of
a substantial number of nations regarding a point of international
law.63
law has been considered evidence of existing international
Specifically, the fact that the General Assembly unanimously affirmed
by its Resolution that genocide was a crime under international law
was thought by one tribunal to be "persuasive evidence of the fact,"
and it added: "We approve and adopt its conclusions.""M Furthermore, the International Court of Justice made reference to the action
of the United Nations in unanimously approving the Genocide Convention, which called genocide "a crime under international law";
and in the light of this, it concluded that the principles underlying
the Convention were principles "which are recognized by civilized
nations as binding on States, even without any conventional obligation. '"" This appears to be a clear pronouncement by the International Court that "genocide has been recognized as a crime under
international law in the full legal meaning of this term"-to use the
language of an Israeli court, which so interpreted the decision of the
International Court in convicting Eichmann for his part in trying to
eliminate the Jews." The United States, by becoming a party to the
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, by voting in favor of the
General Assembly Resolution on genocide, and by signing the Genocide Convention, would seem to be committed to this view. In the
light of all these circumstances, there is little doubt that Congress has
the authority to enact legislation making genocide a crime when
committed in the United States, since it would be defining and
punishing a crime against the law of nations. This appears to have
been the view of the Foreign Relations Committee in recommending
that Congress pass such legislation before the Convention was ratified.
The other principal obligation that we would assume should we
03As to U. N. resolutions adopted by a large majority being evidence of existing
international law, see Chayes, The Legal Adviser, Dept. of State, 48 DEPT. OF STATE
BuLL. 837 (1963); Schachter, The Relation of Law, Politics and Action in the United
Nations, 109 RECUE DES COURS 165, 184 (1963); Jennings, Recent Developments in
the International Law Commission: Its Relation to the Sources of InternationalLaw,
13 IwT'L & ComrP. L. Q. 385-93 (1964); Stavropoulos, Legal Counsel of the United
Nations, Letter of May 11, 1970, 65 Am. J. INT'L L. 605 (1971). As to a treaty drafted
by a conference of a substantial number of nations being evidence of existing international law see Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia, [1970] I.C.J. 359, reproduced in 10 INTL LEGAL MATERIALS 677,
705, (treaty not yet in force); Nottebohm Case, [1955] I.C.J. 4, 22-23 (treaties to
which states in the litigation were not parties) ; Lambros Seaplane Base v. The Batory,
215 F.2d 228, 233 (2d Cir. 1954) (three treaties, one which the U.S. never ratified,
one which it had denounced, and one which never came into force).
64 U.S. v. Alstoetter, 3 TRIAL Or WAR CRIMNALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILILAW No. 10, 954, 983 (1948).
TARY TRIBUNALS UNIDER CONTROL CouiNC
65 Advisory Opinion: Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, [1951] I.C.J.

23.

66 Attorney General v. Eichmann, 36 Int'l L. Rep. 5, para. 19 (Israeli Distr. Ct.,
Jerusalem, 1961), in 56 Am. J. INT'L L. 805, 814 (1956).
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ratify the Genocide Convention would be to provide means for the
extradition of those who commit genocide. Extradition in this country
has traditionally been handled under bilateral extradition treaties. 7
Indeed, it cannot be demanded of us, as of right, or granted by our
Government, in the absence of a treaty. 8
It should be noted that the Genocide Convention is not a multilateral extradition treaty: it is a multilateral treaty by which we
would agree to make new, or amend existing, bilateral extradition
treaties to provide extradition for the crime of genocide. Once Congress enacts a statute making genocide a crime under our law, there
would appear to be no difficulty in our amending existing treaties
or in making new extradition treaties to cover it.
The novel feature for us is that the Genocide Convention would
bar any claim that an act of genocide was a political offense. 9 We
have considered political offenses as non-extraditable, and our treaties
provide accordingly. However, this is believed to be a matter of
policy, giving effect to our tradition of offering political asylum in
this country to those fearing political persecution at home. To suggest
changing this position raises a very serious policy question. It was
for this very reason that the United Kingdom also declined to ratify
the Convention.7 ° Nevertheless, should we decide to change our longstanding policy in this respect, no constitutional difficulty is perceived
in the adoption of statutes or treaties providing for the extradition
of political offenders. Furthermore, "there does not appear to be any
generally recognized rule of international law that a State may not
surrender ...

political offenders if it chooses to do so.""

Just as we found that Congress has the authority to enact a
statute making genocide a punishable crime, there is also the authority to enter into bilateral extradition treaties making genocide an
extraditable offense. This can be done, if we choose, even though
there be a claim that it was a political offense.
Our only multilateral extradition treaty "is presently inoperative." See TRE.AFORCE 293, n.1 (1971).
68 Valentine v. U.S. ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 8-9 (1936);
Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933). See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181, 3184 (1971);
and
Argento v. Horn, 241 F.2d 258, 259 (6th Cir. 1957).
69 See Appendix at art. VII; 11 WHITEMAN, supra note 14, at 848, 850.
70 British Lord Privy Seal Heath, quoted in 11 WHITEMAN,
supra note 14, at 871.
71 6 WHITEMAN, supra note 14, at 853. See also authorities
quoted, at 799-857.
The United States has just signed a treaty with Canada which excludes from
the
"political offense" exception those charged with hijacking aircraft
or with kidnapping,
murder or assault committed against persons to whom we have a duty, under
international law, to give special protection. See art. 4(2) of this treaty in 65 DEPT.
STATE
67

TIES

BULL. 743 (1971).
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The Basic Legal Question.
Since there is authority to carry out the obligations imposed by
the Convention, we are brought again to the basic legal question:
Is there a constitutional objection to the United States becoming a
party? As we saw in the discussion of the basic legal objection to
other human rights treaties,7 2 the issue involves consideration of the
objectives and techniques of the treaty. What is the objective of the
Convention, and how would the technique employed affect the United
States? Is it dealing with matters in the field of external relations
and foreign affairs? Would it merely be making law for this country
in its relations between the Government and its people regarding
matters which are essentially internal?
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee says the objective of
the Convention is "to make genocide an international crime, whether
committed during peace or war."7" However, we have seen that
genocide is already a crime under international law "even without
any conventional obligation." 74 The Convention itself takes this
view, for it does not purport to "make" genocide a crime, but instead,
75
it "confirms" that it already "is" one. Rather, the objective of the
Convention is to have the parties make genocide a punishable crime
under their own domestic law, and an extraditable offense under their
bilateral extradition treaties.
This technique can hardly be said to be dealing with "international" problems which require international agreement between
States for solution 6 The fact that every country that becomes a
party to the Convention must conform its domestic criminal law to
a prescribed standard is not making international law or resolving
an international problem. It is making uniform domestic law for the
parties, and it is done in order to resolve their parallel but separate
domestic problems. It is a technique closely allied to that employed
in other human rights conventions, discussed above."
It may be argued by some that there can be no objection to
our ratification of the Convention, since it would obligate us to enter
into extradition treaties on genocide, and extradition clearly deals
72 See text accompanying notes 39-51, supra.
73 S. EXEC. REP. No. 92-6, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1971).

74 See Appendix at art. I: "The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide . . . is
a crime under international law." See also 11 WHITEMAN, supra note 14, at 848-49.
75 Id.
76 See text accompanying notes 39-51, supra.
77 See text accompanying note 39, supra. See also Tate, Deputy Legal Adviser,
Dept. of State, 22 DEPT. STATE BULL. 91-92 (1950),
note 14, at 313-14.

reprinted in 14

WHITEMAN,

supra
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with a matter between states. But that is not the correct analysis of
the problem posed by the Convention. The Genocide Convention is
neither a multilateral nor a bilateral extradition treaty. Rather, the
question posed is whether the United States should enter, not into
an extradition treaty, but into a treaty requiring us to make an extradition treaty. This would in turn require us to change our domestic
legal situation. It is this precise situation under domestic law to
which the Convention addresses itself.
In any event, extradition is merely a procedure ancillary to the
main purpose of the Convention. The fundamental purpose is to
have a statutory basis established for the punishment of genocide,
and thus, in the words of the preamble, "liberate mankind from such
an odious scourge ....,17Even if the extradition requirement in
other circumstances might be unobjectionable, it can hardly remedy
a constitutional objection to the main purpose of the Convention, or,
validate what would otherwise be an unconstitutional act.
Although the provisions of the Convention are not self-executing,7 9 the United States would be assuming an international obligation to enact a new criminal statute and hence change the law of
this country. Our extradition treaties are self-executing." To assume
an obligation to enter into such treaties again is an obligation to
change our law. Undoubtedly, the Convention would be interpreted
as requiring us to keep in force our laws which have the effect of
implementing the Convention. But an obligation not to change a law,
even if we desire to do so, would cause the law to continue in force,
and thus, again make law for the United States. As in the case of
other human rights treaties, our ratification of the Genocide Convention would have no appreciable effect abroad;8 1 its only effect would
be to make law here."
Furthermore, the changes in the law would concern our domestic
treatment of people within our territory. We would assume an obligation to set forth in our law methods for handling those who commit
genocide within our jurisdiction, and a further obligation to cover
by our bilateral extradition treaties (and hence by our law) how
we would deal with those found within our borders who have committed genocide abroad. These matters concern the relations between
the Government and its people, and they "do not have any direct
bearing upon our conduct in the society of nations"; 88 they are
78
79
80
81

11 W=mTr Aw, supra note 14, at 849.

See notes 52-53 and accompanying text, supra.

See
See
82 See
83 See

note 39, supra.
text accompanying notes 30-38, supra.
Appendix at art. V. See also 11 WHITEMAN, supra note 14, at 850.
text accompanying note 37, supra.
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nations in
matters "which do not essentially affect the actions of
'' within the
relation to international affairs, but are purely internal"
meaning of John Foster Dulles.
The Constitution prescribes that the Congress is to legislate on
federal matters; the State legislatures, or the people themselves, on
all other matters.8" The only significant effect, of our ratification of
for the people of
the Genocide Convention would be to "make laws
86 within the meaning
concerns,"
the United States in their internal
of Charles Evans Hughes, and such action would therefore breach
the limitations of the treaty power which he sets forth. Again, as
Dulles declared: the treaty power should not be employed when to
established
do so would "circumvent the constitutional procedure concern."
's
domestic
of
matters
in relation to what are essentially
Ratification of the Genocide Convention would circumvent these
very specific prescriptions of the Constitution of the United States,
and violate the precepts of experienced and respected authorities.
Such a step should not be taken.
CONCLUSION

As to human rights treaties in general, let us not make the
mistake of writing law for this country by treaty unless there exists a
problem in the field of external relations for which such action is
essential to an equitable solution. Let us pause for a moment to
realize what it means to take such a step. Human rights involves the
relations between a government and its people. Our ratification of a
human rights treaty would result only in writing the law for the
United States regarding a matter that is entirely within our domestic
jurisdiction. This action would be law made by an agreement with
other nations designed to solve their domestic problems rather than
ours, but which we would then have to honor and enforce as our
law. Our cooperation in this respect would contribute absolutely
nothing to the solution of the problem where it may exist abroad.
This use of a treaty would be a world-law-making technique which
has no advantage for us, and by which we accomplish nothing for
others. It is not a method of law-making which the Constitution
envisages, and its use would circumvent the procedures which the
Constitution prescribes. It should be rejected as being an unconstitutional as well as an unwise employment of the treaty power.
The Genocide Convention in essence obligates its parties to
84 See note 50, supra.
85 U. S. CONST. art. I, § 1; U. S. CONST. amend. X.
86 See text accompanying notes 46-47, supra.
87 See note 40, supra.
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create and to maintain legislation (including that created by extradition treaties) making genocide a punishable and extraditable crime.
Such legislation would be dealing with questions concerning how
the Government of the United States is to deal with people within
its territory. What acts, within its jurisdiction, will it treat as
criminal? Will it extradite foreigners for such acts committed abroad
by them? Such questions essentially involve only the relations of the
Government to its people. They are not in the field of foreign affairs
but are internal matters. There is ample authority to deal with them
if we so desire without assuming any treaty obligations.
Ratification of the Genocide Convention by the United States
would therefore be an unconstitutional use of the treaty power. To
employ the language of the distinguished lawyers and statesmen
quoted above: "[T]he relations of our people ... as between themselves and their government are not properly a concern of other
people and do not have any direct bearing upon our conduct in the
society of nations." 88 Treaties should only be employed to deal with
matters which "pertain to our external relations... to foreign affairs
and not to make laws for the people of the United States in their
internal concerns ...."I'They ought not to "be used as a device to
circumvent the constitutional procedures established in relation to
what are essentially matters of domestic concern"9 which appropriately are within the local jurisdiction.
The conclusion seems clear. The United States should not join
as a party to the Genocide Convention.

APPENDIX A
CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT

OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE

The Contracting Parties,

Having considered the declaration made by the General Assembly of the
United Nations in its resolution 96 (I) dated 11 December 1946 that genocide
is
a crime under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United
Nations and condemned by the civilized world;
Recognizing that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses
on humanity; and
Being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from such an odious
scourge, international co-operation is required,
Hereby agree as hereinafter provided:

88 Hearings on SJ.Res. 1 before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of

the Senate Judiciary Committee, 84th Cong., ist Sess. 183 (1955).
89 23 PROC. Am. Soc'y INT'L L. 194, 195-96 (1929), cited in Henkin, The Constitution, Treaties and International Human Rights, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1012, 1024
(1967-68).
90 Dulles quoted in Power Authority v. FPC, 247 F.2d 538, 543 (D.C.
Cir. 1957),

vacated as moot, sub nom. American Pub. Power Ass'n v. Power Authority, 355 U.S.
64 (1957).

19721

GENOCIDE AND THE CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE I

The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of
peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake
to prevent and to punish.
ARTICLE II
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
ARTICLE III
The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.
ARTICLE rV
Persons commiting genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III
shall be punished, whether -they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials
or private individuals.
ARTICLE V
The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective
Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present
Convention and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or of any of the other acts enumerated in article III.
ARTICLE VI
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III
shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act
was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with
respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.
ARTICLE VII
Genocide and the other acts enumerated in article III shall not be considered as
political crimes for the purpose of extradition.
The Contracting Parties pledge themselves in such cases to grant extradition in
accordance with their laws and treaties in force.
ARTICLE VIII
Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider
appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other
acts enumerated in article III.
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ARTICLE IX
Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application
fulfilment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility
a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall
submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties
the dispute.

ARTICLE XII
Any Contracting Party may at any time, by notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, extend the application of the present Convention
to all or any of the territories for the conduct of whose foreign relations that Contracting Party is responsible.

ARTICLE XIV
The present Convention shall remain in effect for a period of ten years as from
the date of its coming into force.
It shall thereafter remain in force for successive periods of five years for such
Contracting Parties as have not denounced it at least six months before the expiration
of the current period.
Denunciation shall be effected by a written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
ARTICLE XV
If, as a result of denunciations, the number of Parties to the present Convention
should become less than sixteen, the Convention shall cease to be in force as from the
date on which the last of these denunciations shall become effective.

